In 2008 two long-standing regulatory disputes between the United States and the European Union again hit the news. In January 2008 the deadline for the EU's compliance with the World Trade Organisation's (WTO) ruling on its procedures for approving genetically modified organisms (GMOs) expired with only partial compliance. In October 2008 the WTO ruled that the US and Canada had not violated WTO rules by continuing to apply sanctions against the EU despite it having modified its ban on hormone-treated beef. These WTO complaints seem to confirm two separate, but related conventional wisdoms about the transatlantic economic relationship: that it is highly conflictual and that many of the conflicts are rooted in profoundly different approaches to regulation. This article argues that neither conventional wisdom is accurate. Rather, it contends that they are products of two, compounding analytical shortcomings: one methodological, one empirical. The methodological shortcoming takes the form of an implicit selection bias.
A very rudimentary version of this article was presented to the University of Edinburgh's Transatlantic Seminar (4 March 2005). An intermediate version was presented to the 'Domestic Sources of Transatlantic
Regulation ' Workshop, Freie Universität, Berlin (27-28 June 2008) . I am grateful to the participants in both workshops and to two anonymous referees for their comments. I would also like to thank all of those who took time out of their busy schedules to discuss these issues with me. I am grateful to Poppy Winanti for research assistance in developing the database of transatlantic disputes and to Glasgow's Department of Politics for funding her assistance.
The empirical shortcoming has to do with neither the beef hormones nor the GMO dispute demonstrating what it is purported to. The tendency is to depict these WTO complaints as reflecting fundamental differences in the two parties' approaches to regulation, with the US advocating 'sound science' and the EU advocating the 'precautionary principle.' While the US and EU are to an extent responsible for fostering the perception of competing principles, detailed analyses of the prime exhibits invoked to support this conventional wisdom reveal sharply different approaches to risk management within the EU and EU policy outcomes that reflect messy political processes. The EU's regulations, therefore, are more political than principled. Moreover, contrary to how the WTO complaints are normally depicted, how the US pursued those complaints actually supports the characterisation of the transatlantic relationship as tolerant.
In developing this argument, this article draws together research conducted for three previous research projects. One on the early days of the transatlantic dispute over genetically 
The distinctive politics of regulatory trade barriers
Excluding the European Union itself the transatlantic economic relationship is the largest, broadest and most intensive international economic relationship in the world. As tariffs have been reduced through successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, regulatory differences have become increasingly significant obstacles to transatlantic trade in goods (Commission 2008c: 9; USTR 2008: 213) . Because regulations are statutory requirements governing products' characteristics or how they are produced, products that do not meet those requirements cannot be sold where the regulations apply. If regulations governing the same product are different in two markets, a product that complies with the rules of its home market may well be excluded from the other market; thus the regulatory difference impedes trade.
Although there are a wide variety of regulatory barriers that affect transatlantic trade in goods, most of the most problematic concern public-health and environmental rules (Ahearn et al 2008: 34; Atlantic Council 2002; Brittan 2000; Pollack 2003b: 596) .
4
Trade barriers stemming from public-health and environmental rules are particularly difficult to resolve because they are politically distinctive. As with other regulatory trade barriers, the adverse trade consequences of public-health and environmental rules are usually unintended side-effects of policies intended to realise other, domestic policy objectives.
Because public-health and environmental rules are seen as having direct relevance for all citizens of a polity, however, they are widely regarded as being more politically salient than other types of regulation or traditional trade measures (Ahearn et al 2008: 34; Damro and Sbragia 2003; Kahler 1995: 56; Pollack 2003a: 71; Scharpf 1999) .
Consequently, the political calculus of liberalising trade by removing such barriers is distinctive (Evans 2003; Young 2007b) . Traditional trade liberalisation through removing tariffs entails concentrated costs for protected firms and their workers and diffuse benefits for consumers. Where public-health and environmental regulations impede trade, however, liberalisation also entails diffuse costs for citizens in the form of potentially reduced safety or environmental protection thereby undermining political support for liberalisation. 
Conventional wisdom or conventional folly?
Two reinforcing conventional wisdoms have emerged that characterise the transatlantic regulatory relationship:
1. That the US is hostile to regulation while the EU favours stringent (precautionary) public health and environmental regulation; and 2. That the relationship, in part as a consequence, is highly conflictual.
I shall develop each of these conventional wisdoms in turn before turning to their flaws.
CW1: The 'precautionary principle' versus 'sound science'
There is wide-spread acceptance that regulatory differences between the EU and US reflect fundamental differences in how the two polities approach risk. (Woolcock 2002: 9) . As caricatured in the conventional wisdom above, this difference boils down to the EU rejecting all risks and the US being unconcerned about them.
The implication of this conventional wisdom is that regulatory differences between the US and EU are fundamental, and thus enduring and universal.
CW2 The prevalence of trade wars
As a former senior European Commission trade official (Abbott 2003: 563) Nonetheless, with respect to regulatory differences the EU and US have been depicted as 'trading blows' (Woolcock 1991 ), being 'über-competitors' (Carlame 2007 , engaging in regulatory 'competition' (Kupchan 2003: 212-13) , 'conflict' (Cowles 1997: 8) and 'rivalry' (Ahern et al 2008: 35) , and experiencing 'system friction' (Pollack 2003b: 595) . The Atlantic Council (2002: 8) , therefore, identified as its second 'myth' about the transatlantic regulatory relationship that trade disputes pit the 'pro-environment' EU against the 'anti-environment' US; a view articulated by the Amicus Coalition (2004), Carlarne (2007) and Greenpeace (2003, 2006) .
Mutually reinforcing conventional wisdoms
These two conventional wisdoms are mutually reinforcing in two ways. First, regulatory WTO complaints -those concerning the EU's ban on hormone-treated meat and the EU's procedures for approving GMOs --figure prominently in accounts depicting the EU as risk averse and the US as hostile to regulation (Atlantic Council 2002; and see, for example, Ahearn 2007; Carlarne 2007; NFTC 2003; NAM 2004; Thompson 2003 
Two conventional follies
Because WTO complaints are central to both conventional wisdoms, both are rooted in the same methodological and empirical problems. The methodological problem is one of selection bias, considering only those disputes that achieve the prominence of WTO complaints. To an extent this is a manifestation of the 'availability heuristic,' a psychological phenomenon in which people tend to evaluate the frequency or the probability of events by the ease with which relevant instances come to mind (Tversky and Kahneman 1973; 1974) .
This means that more easily recalled events tend to be thought to be more common or likely than less easily recalled ones, even if this is not the case. 8 The US government's position is not complete hostility to the idea of precaution, rather it argues that existing international rules, including those of the WTO, adequately acknowledge the right of governments to exercise precaution and that the balance between scientific uncertainty and the potential for benefit or harm being evaluated on a case-by-case basis (Atlantic Council 2002: 5) . The leaders of the EU (European Council 2000, point 4) also think that WTO rules allow sufficient scope for members to exercise precaution.
CW1 --that the precautionary approach that the EU supposedly adopted in measures challenged in the high-profile WTO complaints and the US's apparent antipathy to it holds for all regulatory decisions --is informed by the 'availability heuristic.' CW1 goes beyond a focus on the probability of events to generalise from the readily available examples (WTO complaints) to the many, lower profile regulatory differences (Wiener 2004: 75) . In the vast majority of cases the act of generalisation is implicit. 9 CW2 about the conflictual nature of the transatlantic regulatory relationship is a more straight-forward manifestation of the 'availability heuristic,' in which the overwhelming focus on the WTO complaints that there have been rather than considering those issues that have not become WTO complaints, creates the impression of extensive conflict. Generalisations based on this type of selection bias, however, are methodologically unsound (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 129; Moses and Knutsen 2007: 114) .
The beef-hormone and GMO disputes are highly atypical as they represent the only two transatlantic public health and environmental regulatory disputes to have been pursued through adjudication before the WTO. 10 In contrast, examination of the Commission's and USTR's annual reports on the other's trade barriers reveals a great many environmental and public health rules that have provoked concern, but that have not escalated, despite being longstanding sources of irritation (see Table 1 ).
Insert Table 1 about here 9 Greg Shaffer and Mark Pollack (2005: 172) are rare in explicitly 'resist extrapolating' from their study of GMOs to the relative importance of precaution in the EU and US. 10 Another WTO complaint was the EU's challenge to a US ban on poultry imports, which was resolved at the consultation phase (USTR 2009). The US filed a WTO complaint in January 2009, in the final days of the Bush administration, against the EU's ban on antimicrobial treatment of poultry. At the time of writing (April 2009) it is too soon to tell whether and how it will be pursued, particularly give the subsequent change in the US administration. In any event, this dispute is too recent to have shaped the conventional wisdoms. Another dispute involved a US challenge to EU restrictions on aircraft retrofitted with 'hushkits' to comply with noise limits, which was addressed through mediation by the International Civil Aviation Organisation ( The next two sections of the article take each conventional wisdom in turn. In each case it examines both how consideration of the full range of regulatory activity in the EU and US paints a different picture of the regulatory relationship than that painted by a focus on only WTO complaints and how detailed analysis of the prime exhibits for the conventional wisdoms do not actually support their claims.
Countering CW1: Not sound science versus the precautionary principle
The conventional wisdom suggested by a focus on only the high-profile transatlantic WTO disputes implies that the US should not have any public health or environmental regulations that impede trade. Looking beyond the transatlantic disputes, however, yields a different picture. The US too has stringent public-health and environmental rules, as the EU's litany of US rules that impede trade (see Rather than the US simply being less risk averse than the EU, as CW1 suggests, there are three distinct qualifications regarding their respective attitudes towards risk. One concerns differences in priorities. Another concerns change over time. The third concerns differences within each of the polities. Although these qualifications are often depicted as alternatives, they essentially reinforce each other. The first two qualifications are based primarily on assessments of regulations, the outputs of political processes, while the third emphasises that regulatory decisions are contested. It is, therefore, not surprising that the stringency of regulations varies across issues or over time.
The first qualification to the conventional wisdom that the US is less risk-averse than the EU is that they actually differ with regard to which risks they prioritise (Wiener 2004: 74; Wiener and Rogers 2002: 319) . Hammitt et al (2005 Hammitt et al ( : 1223 , for instance, found that US regulations tend to be more precautionary than the EU's with respect to pollution and medication/medical treatment, while EU rules are more precautionary with regard to food/agriculture, human disease/health, toxic substances and ecological risks. The two polities' rules were equally precautionary with respect to consumer protection. Even within these broad categories there are marked differences with respect to which risks are regulated stringently. With regard to food safety, for example, the US rules tend to be more precautionary than the EU's with regard to potential carcinogens and traditional foods, such as raw milk cheeses and cured meets (Vogel 2003: 562) . 12 One Commission regulator described the US approach to many aspects of food safety as 'very precautionary and 12 For an overview of precaution in US food safety see FDA and DoA (2000) .
distortive'. 13 The EU, by contrast, tends to be more precautionary with regard to new food technologies, including the use of hormones, genetic modification and irradiation (Vogel 2003: 562) . Thus the two high-profile WTO complaints that inform CW1 both happen to concern issues about which the EU is more precautionary than the US.
The second qualification to CW1 is that the relative stringency of US and EU regulation has changed over time. US regulations tended to be more precautionary than the EU's into the 1980s, but that the EU has adopted more precautionary rules than the US since The comparative literature on transatlantic regulation suggests that contingent factors shaped differences in regulatory approaches since 1990. In particular, a number of regulatory failures in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s -including the Chernobyl nuclear disaster , the Sandoz river fire, BSE, dioxin, and AIDS-tainted blood -contributed to public distrust of regulation and gave European policy makers strong incentives to err on the side of caution (Ahearn 2007: 26; Christoforou 2004: 31; Vogel 2003: 572-3 rooted cultural difference with respect to risk aversion (Vogel 2003: 580; Wiener 2004: 91; Wiener and Rogers 2002: 339) .
The third qualification to CW1 -that attitudes towards risk vary within the two polities -helps to explain variation across issues and over time. Murphy and Levidow (2006: 1 and 8) explicitly criticise many of the existing accounts of the transatlantic dispute over
GMOs for treating the EU and the US as the units of analysis, which, they argue, leads to 'a tendency to stereotype the EU and the US and to imply that a consensus has emerged in each one.' By contrast, studies of regulatory policy-making within each polity emphasise how contested regulations are (see below).
With regard to EU policy-making much of the focus tends to be on the different policy preferences of the member states, which are usually assumed to be informed by the preferences of the parties in government and the strength of environmental and consumer groups and business interests (for a review see Young 2010) . Significantly, Jasanoff (2005; has identified significant differences in the preference for precaution within and between EU member states. Because the EU's treaties permit member states to maintain stringent national environmental and public health regulations, subject to certain conditions and judicial review, the drive to create the single European market by eliminating regulatory barriers to trade from the mid-1980s created a dynamic of 'trading-up' through which the product regulations of the more risk-averse states have tended to be adopted at the EU level (Vogel 1995; Young 2004; Young and Wallace 2000) . 15 Thus it is not surprising that Eckley and Selin (2004: 98) found that the 'precautionary principle' has affected debates within and international pronouncements by the EU, but has had little impact on policy outcomes.
Political contestation has also shaped the contours and evolution of environmental and public safety regulation in the US, although the political dynamics have been very different.
15 For a review of the literature on how the single European market process tends to lead to more stringent public health and environmental regulation, see Young (2007a: 383-5) .
While interest group competition and institutional changes were crucial to explaining the contours of US environmental and public health regulation through the 1980s (Vogel 1989) , subsequently the relative power of the political parties has been seen as the crucial factor. In particular, the Republican Party, which has become resistant to public-health and environmental regulation, used its control of at least one house of Congress (1995 Congress ( -2007 and/or the Presidency ( credence to the thesis that US environmental and public health regulation is shaped more by politics than by a fundamental attitude towards risk.
Empirical shortcomings: Politics rather than principle
Although there are exceptions (see, for example, Krenzler and MacGregor 2000: 314-5) , the vast majority of detailed analyses of the EU decision-making processes leading to the ban on hormone-treated beef and the adoption and application of GMO approval procedures do not explain the outcomes in terms of fundamental risk-aversion. Rather, they provide additional support for the view that transatlantic regulatory differences reflect political rather than principled differences. CW1's focus on regulatory outcomes, therefore, tends to exaggerate the underlying differences.
The beef-hormone dispute was due to the EU banning the use of growth promoting hormones permitted in the US because of concerns that their residues could adversely affect human health. The ban had its origins in highly publicised health scares stemming from prohibited hormones used in raising livestock. At the time the EU's member states had very different assessments of the safety of five other hormones used in raising beef; the Italian and Luxembourg governments banned all five; the British and Irish governments permitted all five, and the Danish, French and German governments permitted the use of some (Agence Europe, 29/30 September 1989, p. 9; Vogel, 1997). These differences impeded the free circulation of beef within the EU, which was particularly problematic given the objective of eliminating regulatory barriers to trade (creating a single European market) by 1992 (Vogel 1997 ).
The European Commission, the EU's supranational executive, initially proposed banning only the two synthetic hormones but permitting the controlled use of the three natural hormones. In the face of stiff opposition from consumer groups, the European Parliament and most of the member states, however, the Commission revised its proposal to ban the three natural hormones as well (Princen 2002; WTO 1997: para II.29) . Some governments opposed the ban, but were outvoted. Moreover, the Parliament 'regret [ted] ' that the Commission had proposed banning the two synthetic hormones without waiting for scientific committee reports, but still welcomed the ban because their safety had not been conclusively proven.
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The adoption of the beef hormone ban, while perhaps reflecting a precautionary approach on the part of the European Parliament and some member states, reveals significant differences with regard to precaution within the EU. It was the EU's institutional framework -both the drive to create the single European market and the EU's decision rules -which resolved the internal political contest in the form of a precautionary regulatory outcome.
16 EC Official Journal, C288/158 11 November 1985, Point E.
The adoption, development and application of the EU's GMO approval procedures were also characterized by the need to reconcile different approaches to regulation within the Commission and among the member states. The resulting procedures were also markedly different from those in the US, with the US treating GM crops and foods as 'substantially equivalent' from non-GM varieties and, therefore, not requiring specially regulatory procedures and the EU regarding them as inherently different and requiring a distinctive approval process (see Shaffer 2009, Young 2001) . The EU's approach is thus more precautionary than that adopted by the US.
This outcome, however, was the product of political competition between those in the Commission and among the member states who advocated a pro-biotechnology approach and those in the Commission and among the member states that favoured a more precautionary approach (Patterson 2000; Pollack and Shaffer 2009) . Although the EU's approval process was slow, it worked at first, but in 1998 the member states stopped considering approvals.
Although the Commission had the authority to approve GM varieties, it did not do so because it was concerned about antagonising the member states and public opinion. 17 In addition, during 1997-98 several member states prohibited the sale or cultivation of even EU-approved varieties of GM crops. In 1999 several member states declared that they would not approve any new GM crops until more stringent procedures were adopted (Council 1999) . In order to get the approval process going again, the Commission initiated a series of reforms, which, because they had to placate the most reluctant member states, meant that the EU further tightened its regulation of genetically modified crops (Pollack and Shaffer 2009; Young 2004 ). The reforms extended the regulatory framework to include GM animal feed; placed greater emphasis on precaution and on environmental risk assessment based on common principles; limited approvals to 10 years (which may be extended upon review); eliminated 
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The preceding discussion underlines that attitudes towards risk regulation are not monolithic within either the US or the EU. Moreover, the differences between the US's and EU's approaches to regulation are much less stark than CW1 suggests. 
Countering CW2: Tolerance, not trade wars
The tendency to depict the transatlantic regulatory relationship as highly conflictual (CW2), in some respects, reflects a more straightforward example of the 'availability heuristic' than CW1. Here the high-profile disputes are not taken to reflect underlying regulatory differences, but to characterize the nature of the relationship; the perception of the frequency of conflict is distorted by the few high-profile disputes. Strikingly, WTO complaints regarding regulatory barriers are more likely to escalate to formal adjudication than are other types of complaint (Busch and Reinhardt 2003: 475; Guzman and Simmons 2002) . This finding, however, has to be treated with caution as the analysis is based on only those trade disputes that become formal WTO complaints; a significant selection bias, again based on the most readily available cases (Busch and Reinhardt, 2002) . The vast number of regulatory barriers, including many that have been long-standing irritants, that have not become transatlantic WTO complaints, suggests that the transatlantic relationship is characterized by tolerance, more than by conflict. 20 The US government's intervention on discussions within the UN's Codex Alimentarius, which sets international food safety standards, on Working Principles for Risk Analysis, 'endorse [d] ' that 'precaution has been and should remain an essential element of risk analysis in the formulation of national and international standards,' and went on to state, 'The United States believes that precaution is essential throughout risk analysis, including risk assessment, risk management and risk communication ' (FSIS 2000: 3) . 21 The US, for example, tends to make greater use of market incentives, while the EU relies more heavily on command and control measures. US regulations are usually adopted as administrative decisions while in the EU they take the form of legislation. In the US there is greater faith in ex-post monitoring and producer liability, while the EU emphasises ex-ante regulation. Both sides adopt rules with extraterritorial implications, albeit on different issues. See also Wiener (2004); Woolcock (1991) .
Although a comprehensive analysis of why only a few regulatory barriers have been the subject of transatlantic WTO complaints is beyond the scope of this article, the literature on WTO complaints suggests several possible, reinforcing explanations. Four particularly important considerations seem to inform the decision to initiate (or not) a WTO complaint:
the value of the impeding measure (Allee 2003; Bown 2005a, b; Shaffer 2003; Sherman 2002) ; the likelihood of winning the complaint and securing compliance (Allee 2003; Bown 2005a Bown , 2005b ; the potential political repercussions of initiating a complaint (Bown 2005b; Guzman and Simmons 2005) ; and the danger of setting a precedent that constrains one's own regulatory autonomy (Bown 2005a; Busch and Reinhardt 2002; Shaffer 2003 ).
Whether it is worth pursing a regulatory measure depends in large part on how much trade it prevents. Strikingly, only a very small proportion of the regulations notified by the two polities to the WTO's TBT and SPS Committees appear to be raised as matters of concern by firms, as reflected in the Commission's and USTR's annual reports on trade barriers. This may be because the regulations do not present a particular problem for them; the regulations may be sufficiently similar to domestic rules or the firm's own standards so as not to hinder trade or they may be accommodated by an easy and relatively inexpensive change in design or production. very high levels of mutual foreign direct investment and, associated, intra-firm trade (Hamilton and Quinlan 2005) . Thus it would seem that the vast majority of environmental and public health regulations adopted by both the EU and the US cause only minimal trade friction.
If a regulation does impose significant economic costs, there is the crucial question of whether it is permitted under WTO rules. Subject to procedural requirements, the WTO's rules give governments a considerable degree of regulatory autonomy, including with regard to the level of risk they are willing to accept (DeSombre and Barkin, 2002; Esserman and Howse, 2003; Hoberg 2001; Marceau and Trachtman 2002; Neumann and Türk 2003; PIU 2000; Pollack and Shaffer 2009; Young 2005; Young and Holmes 2006) . As a result, it is perfectly possible for a regulation to impede trade, but to still be compatible with WTO rules.
As government officials do not want to lose complaints they bring, they bring them very selectively, targeting only the most clear-cut violations of WTO rules (Allee 2003) .
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If trade officials think a complaint is winnable, they also weigh the political implications of initiating and winning it. Because initiating a WTO complaint is seen as an aggressive act, the WTO dispute literature notes that states are, ceteris paribus, less likely to initiate a complaint against a country with which they have close relations (Bown 2005b; Guzman and Simmons 2005) . As noted earlier, public health and environmental regulations are particularly politically salient and so challenging them might be especially disruptive to good relations. As a consequence, trade officials may think twice before initiating a WTO complaint against a regulatory measure that has strong domestic support. Trade officials also consider whether by successfully challenging a foreign government's rule they might establish a precedent that applies to their own policies (Shaffer 2003 There are thus a series of layered considerations that may explain why so few public health public health and environmental regulations are challenged in the context of the transatlantic relationship. First, they many not impose sufficient costs on the other's firms to make action worthwhile. Even if they do, the regulations may be consistent with WTO rules and so not be actionable. Even if the costs are significant and the case seems winnable it might still not be worth initiating because doing so might damage the wider relationship or winning the complaint might have adverse implications for one's own regulatory activity.
That CW1 is incorrect is crucial to the likelihood of winning and concern about avoiding precedents being relevant in transatlantic WTO complaints. If the US were as hostile to environmental and public health regulation as CW1 suggests, it would have resisted, rather than supported, ensuring that governments' regulatory autonomy was safeguarded in WTO rules. Moreover, it would be unconcerned about setting precedents that constrain its own regulatory activity.
Empirical shortcoming: Surgical strikes, not all-out assaults
Contrary to many depictions (see, for example, Amicus Coalition 2004; Bernauer 2003: 167; Greenpeace 2003 Greenpeace , 2006 Guzman 2004-05: 32; Ramjoué 2007: 420) , the US's WTO complaints against the EU's ban on hormone-treated beef and moratorium on approvals of genetically modified crops were not all-out assaults on the precautionary principle, but were actually fairly narrow challenges to the EU's measures. rules, seeking to avoid setting awkward precedents and, to a limited extent, by consideration of political repercussions.
In its challenge to the EU's ban on hormone-treated beef, 30 the US accepted that the EU had the right under the SPS Agreement to set the level of protection it considered appropriate, although it argued that the ban was 'arbitrary and unjustified,' because the EU permitted the use of other additives that posed similar risks (WTO 1997: 37) . 31 Another key argument was that there was no scientific evidence that the hormones were unsafe when used appropriately. This was relevant to the principle of precaution as the EU justified its action on there being reason to doubt that the hormones were safe because evidence of their safety was incomplete. The Commission's (subsequent) guidance on the precautionary principle, however, states that recourse to it 'presupposes that potentially dangerous effects deriving from a phenomenon, product or process have been identified, and that scientific evaluation does not allow the risk to be determined with sufficient certainty (Commission 2000: 3). The US also argued that the ban was really motivated by the EU not wanting to increase beef production given existing costly surpluses generated by the Common Agricultural Policy.
The WTO's Appellate Body ruled that the EU's bans were incompatible with WTO rules because they were not based on a risk assessment, but in this and subsequent judgments it has allowed a significant degree of discretion with the management of identified potential riskswhat level of risk is acceptable and how that level is realized -even when there is uncertainty about the scientific evidence of the risk involved (PIU 2000: 94; Skogstad 2001: 494-5 ).
These clarifications of WTO disciplines shaped the substance of the US's subsequent WTO complaint against the EU's GMO approval procedures (USTR 2004: 1), 32 as did 30 For a summary of the arguments, see Roberts (1998: 388-92) . 31 In its response to the EU's challenge to it not lifting its sanctions in the wake of the EU's revised rules, the US again did not challenge the precautionary principle, but complained that the EU's bans were still not based on adequate risk assessment (USTR 2005 argued that the 'moratorium' constituted an 'undue delay' and than it and the individual member state bans had not been based on risk assessments. Thus the challenge was to the EU's failure to apply its own procedures and to enforce its own rules rather than to the substance of or principles underpinning those procedures. The WTO panel found that the moratorium violated WTO rules, but only because it led to undue delays, and that the member states' bans violated WTO rules because they were not based on risk assessments. Notably, neither the EU nor the US appealed the ruling. The details of the two high profile WTO complaints, in addition to being rare exceptions, therefore, suggest a much more constrained contestation than is commonly depicted.
Conclusion
This article has argued that the two prominent conventional wisdoms about the transatlantic regulatory relationship -that it is highly conflictual and that the conflicts are rooted in profoundly different approaches to regulation -are ill-founded. First, they are based on implicit selection bias, a manifestation of the 'availability heuristic,' and generalise from the contests between 'sound science' and the 'precautionary principle.' The adoptions of the EU's ban on hormone treated beef and its approach to the approval of genetically modified crops were the products of political competition among actors with very different approaches to the regulation of risk. The regulatory outcomes therefore reflect the hurly burly of politics rather than neat application of a regulatory principle. Moreover, the US's WTO complaints against the hormone-treated beef ban and the EU's moratorium on approvals of genetically modified crops did not challenge the precautionary principle.
Although the EU and the US do adopt different regulations and these differences can and do impede trade and create trade tensions, this article argues that these differences are not rooted in profoundly different approaches to regulation between the two polities. Different approaches to the regulation of risk exist within each polity and the ensuing political competition within each polity produces regulatory outcomes of different stringency across issues and over time. While this distinction may not seem great, it has great consequence.
Because both polities sometimes regulates stringently each is more tolerant of the other doing so. Rather than being characterised by conflict or cooperation, therefore, the transatlantic regulatory relationship is really one of tolerance, in which the vast majority of regulatory differences are not resolved; neither amicably nor through litigation.
More broadly, this article should serve as a cautionary tale about the dangers of relying on obvious cases when describing and explaining political phenomena. WTO complaints are both the most visible disputes and the most atypical. Generalising from them gives both a distorted picture of the transatlantic relationship and suggests misleading explanations for regulatory differences. These misperceptions can then influence policy by making accommodation seem harder and confrontation more necessary. Notes: Issues in small caps have been the subject of a WTO complaint.
* There are also public health issues associated with the dispute over GMOs, but the main area of difference has to do with cultivation and protecting the environment
